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Although the differences between Kierkegaard and Grundtvig both l in style and content are undeniable, there are also some impor­
tant similarities. First, they both criticize romantic philosophy for 
mediating Christian faith and denying the importance of the unique 
historical event on which that faith is dependent.1
Second, both in Grundtvig and Kierkegaard there is a hermeneu­
tic of Christian faith which states the full development of human exis­
tence as a necessary condition for attaining faith. Finally, both Kierke­
gaard and Grundtvig are extremely difficult to interpret in a consi­
stent way. It could be said that while Kierkegaard meant the difficulti­
es to be there, the problem in the case of Grundtvig is that his views 
on fundamental issues several times underwent dramatic changes, 
and therefore it is hard to state the fundamental and genuine Grundt- 
vigian doctrine.
However, the purpose of this article is not to undertake a com­
parison between Kierkegaard and Grundtvig, but to describe and dis­
cuss the criticism of Kierkegaard by the theologian and philosopher 
Knud E. Løgstrup (1905-1981). Starting in the Tidehverv movement he 
gradually developed into an ardent critic of both existentialist theolo­
gy and Kierkegaard. It would, however, be misleading to take this cri­
ticism as a starting-point. His main project is not anti-Kierkegaardia- 
nism, but a reinterpretation of the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of crea­
tion, developed as an ongoing dialogue with, and criticism of, the 
transcendental idealistic element in post-Kantian continental philoso­
phy (especially in neo-Kantianism and Heidegger).
Although Løgstrup never entered into a serious Grundtvig study, 
it is adequate to judge his contribution as a modern and actual ex­
pression of the main Grundtvigian ideas.2 In Løgstrup the controversy
between Kierkegaardianism and Grundtvigianism is about the role of 
the human agent in defining or creating the boundaries of human life. 
According to L0gstrup the most important task for philosophy is to 
describe the overlooked boundaries of uncorrupted life itself. In Kier­
kegaard the boundaries cannot be separated from immediate life- 
forces, but are dependent on the ability of reflection and on resigna­
tion from involvement in everyday life.3
L0gstrup’s Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of Creation
I n his dissertation (1942) L0 gstrup deals with the epistemological conflict between theology and transcendental idealism, i.e., the 
neo-Kantianism of Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), Heinrich Rickert 
(1863-1936), Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) and the early Heidegger (1889- 
1976).4 Right through all differences these philosophers adhere to a 
doctrine which states that the formal element in knowledge is depen­
dent on the creativity of the subject, while the material element 
comes from outside. Applied to the theological knowledge of God, 
this view creates an insuperable difficulty since a God dependent on 
man is no longer God. Either the knowledge of God contained in theo­
logical doctrine must be given up, or theology must free itself from 
the epistemological boundaries of critical philosophy.
The first step in L0gstrup’s solution is his criticism of the Ger­
man theologian F. K. Schumann.5 Without going into detail, the main 
point in L0gstrup’s criticism is that Schumann (and Johannes 
Rehmke, whose epistemological theories Schumann is dependent on) 
reduces the problem of knowledge to the problem of sensation. The 
problem dealt with by transcendental idealism is the so-called “prob­
lem of transcendence”, i.e., the problem of understanding: how can 
the human mind understand what is not human? Is all knowledge an­
thropomorphism? In the conflict between epistemology and theology 
the problem is not how to describe the process of sensation, but how 
to describe the possibility of human understanding.
Transcendental idealism solves this latter problem by ap­plying Kant’s method of analyzing the a priori element in all 
knowledge, claiming it to be the product of faculties in the subject. 
The world as we know it is therefore constituted by us ourselves, al­
though this is not a deliberate act. According to L0gstrup this view of 
knowledge describes it as an act which fails to change its object, an act 
which “is lost on” the objectively given and therefore alone affects 
the acting subject. Consequently, the world we know is seen as a 
world we ourselves have shaped. We are not creators like the God of 
the Old Testament, but demiurges like the one in Plato’s Timaeus, 
shaping an unshaped material.
The second step in Logstrup’s discussion is to interpret tran­
scendental idealism as an expression of what he calls the secular life 
view. The essence of this is that there are no definitive forms not cre­
ated by man. The cultural endeavour of man is based on a shapeless 
raw material.
Finally, the third step is the pointing out of the differences be­
tween this secular view and the understanding of life presupposed in 
the Old Testament and manifest in the preaching of Jesus, i.e., the 
Judaeo-Christian understanding of life. According to this view uncor­
rupted life contains definite forms originated not by man but by God. 
The doctrine of creation is not a (scientific) theory of the origin of 
the universe, but an awareness of the definitive elements involved in 
the process of life as it takes place in interpersonal situations.
Interpreting the conflict between theology and transcendental 
epistemology in this way, L0gstrup concludes that since theology 
does not adhere to the profane understanding of life it is not obliged 
to respect the epistemological boundaries. In addition, he gives a 
philosophical diagnosis of transcendental epistemology: it is the epi­
stemology of a lonely subject confronted with a silent material. Fol­
lowing the dialogue philosophy of K. L0with (1897-1973), Ferdinand 
Ebner (1882-1931) and Martin Buber (1878-1965), L0gstrup underlines 
that in the interpersonal situation the subject is not confronted with 
a silent material, but with a speaking person.
Transcending the sphere of dialogue philosophy, the project of 
the later philosophy of L0gstrup is to describe the pre-cultural defini­
tive forms presupposed by the Judaic-Christian life-view by using the 
method of phenomenology developed by Hans Lipps (1889-1941) -  an 
almost forgotten hermeneutic-phenomenological philosopher critical 
of Husserl and, on some points, Heidegger. L0gstrup starts from con­
crete phenomenological descriptions of interpersonal phenomena 
(spontaneous life-utterances) like confidence, charity, compassion, 
etc., and states that their definitive form invites a religious interpreta­
tion. That these phenomena have a definitive form means that they
cannot be used for other purposes without destroying them. A chari­
ty implemented for other reasons than to help the needy is no longer 
charity.
Logstrup’s reformulation of the doctrine of creation contains 
both an element of rethinking the doctrine as it is presented in the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition (i.e., Old and New Testament), and an 
effort to show how it is attainable from empirical phenomenological 
descriptions. The metaphysics of the late Logstrup consist for a large 
part of extensions of the phenomenology of interpersonal phenome­
na to natural phenomena.
L0gstrlip’s Criticism of Kierkegaard
L0gstrup’s criticism of Kierkegaard deals with both Kierkegaard’s i theological and philosophical views. It is, however, not an inter­
nal criticism, focusing on self-contradictions, etc. In the preface to his 
main book on Kierkegaard (from 1968) he says that what interests 
him is “the tendency and consequence in his (i.e. Kierkegaard’s) 
understanding of the Christian message, not what he -  also -  has 
said.” Somewhat simplified it could be stated as that the Kierkegaard 
criticism serves as an arena for Logstrup in the process of clarifica­
tion of his own views on human existence and the meaning of the 
Christian religion.
A second comment has to be added. In Logstrup there is a dis­
tinction between a philosophical part of theology and a part which 
deals solely with questions not attainable by human reason. The phil­
osophical part deals with the universal conditions of human life, the 
non-philosophical part deals with the meaning and importance of 
Christ.
In the following I deal only with two philosophical questions: (1) 
Is the epistemology presupposed by Kierkegaard Kantian? And how 
does this affect his view on the relationship between thinking and 
existence? (2) Is there also a Kantian anthropology in Kierkegaard, 
defining human nature as selfish inclination without ethical value?
Epistemological Dimension
At first sight it seems as if there is a stringent epistemology in 
1JL Kierkegaard, it is conceptualized in dialogue with Platonism. In 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), Kierkegaard (i.e. Climacus) 
corrects the description of Socrates given in Philosophical Fragments 
(1844) and states that Socrates’ relationship to the theory of anamne­
sis (knowledge = recollection) is that he always departs from it for 
the sake of existence. While Plato represents the paradigm of idealis­
tic speculation, Socrates invents the position of existential faithful­
ness. Confronted with the possibility of forgetting the existential 
problems, Socrates chooses to stay in the world of finiteness.
Post-Kantian idealism is similar to Platonism in that it forgets 
existence in favour of speculation. But according to Kierkegaard 
there is also another problem connected with it: the philosophical 
elimination of the existential content of the Christian message. For 
this double reason he attacks Hegel and speaks in praise of the 
Socratic ignorance.
Also from the point of view of epistemology Hegelian presuppo­
sitions have to be rejected. In The Concept of Dread (1844) he (i.e. 
Vigilius Haufniensis) makes the distinction between (1) classical phil­
osophy and the philosophy of the Middle Ages which took the reality 
of thinking for granted and (2) the Kantian scepticism. The reality of 
thinking is still an unproved presupposition.6
In Kierkegaard’s description of the difference between thinking 
and existence the transcendental presupposition is apparent. He 
states that while thinking is to translate reality into possibility, exis­
tence means to be faithful to one’s reality. In The Postscript the first 
part of this sentence is expressed as the impossibility of identification 
with the objective.1 There is consequently no such thing in Kierke­
gaard as a Thomistic theory of knowledge as “assimilation” or of 
Schelling’s theory of “intellectual intuition”.
In The Sickness unto Death (1849) Kierkegaard (i.e. Anti-Clima- 
cus) quotes with approval the older Fichte (1762-1824) for the view 
that the imagination is the origin of the categories, i.e., the a priori 
element in knowledge. Imagination is the faculty instar omnium, not 
equal to other faculties, but conditioning their mode. What kind of 
feeling, knowing and willing there is in a man is dependent on his 
imagination. The decisive characterization of imagination is that it is 
the medium of making infinite. According to Kierkegaard two move-
meats are necessary for the constitution of the self: the movement of 
making infinite and the movement of making finite. Stated in anthro­
pological terms: the movement of infinite resignation and abstraction 
and the movement of self-acceptance.
I n conclusion, when Kierkegaard adheres to the transcendental view of knowledge as productivity based on imagination it is 
because this view both (1) gives the movement of making infinite 
(transcending the finite world) its proper role and (2) demonstrates 
the danger connected with forgetting the movement of making finite. 
In the world of fantasy man forgets himself, starts to live fantastically, 
not in accordance with the conditions of finite existence.8
Since existence is defined as decision and action, putting an end 
to possibility, from his epistemology Kierkegaard has to conclude 
that there are no similarities between existence and thinking.
As we have seen, L0 gstrup’s criticism of this epistemology con­
cluded that it forgets the “speaking” agents confronting man and con­
sequently it has to be supplemented with an epistemology of dia­
logue. In other words, the transcendental viewpoint has to be limited 
to our understanding of non-speakers. Applied to Kierkegaard this 
criticism leads to a revision of Kierkegaard’s theory of the relation­
ship between thinking and existence. It points out that philosophical 
knowledge is not necessarily contrary to existence. As description 
and interpretation of the overlooked interpersonal and natural defini­
tive forms it is relevant for man’s existential task of self-acceptance 
and self-realization. Performing the spontaneous life-utterances, man 
attains identity and freedom. Knowledge of these definitive forms 
does not distract us from existence. It gives adequacy to our life-view. 
Kierkegaard is not right in defining the relationship between thinking 
and existence as absolute contradiction, the one having no relevance 
for the other. Knowledge of pre-cultural definitive forms is essential 
for understanding our life-conditions.
Anthropological Dimension
One of the most important anthropological distinctions in Kierke­gaard is the one between living as the individual and living as 
one of the masses. It presupposes that man unlike the animal is not
governed by instincts, and that in the age of reflection (modernity) 
he is not governed by authority either. Left to his own choices, man 
chooses like everybody else and loses his independence and spiritua­
lity.
Kierkegaard’s authorship can be interpreted as expositions of 
different ways of overcoming this situation. Although the possibilities 
of different interpretations of these expositions are numerous, it is 
hard to deny that resignation in some form plays a decisive role for 
Kierkegaard. In Fear and Trembling resignation means to give up one’s 
strongest (life-fulfilling) wish. Faith cannot be reached without resig­
nation because faith actually means the overcoming of this resigna­
tion by believing that for God everything is possible: I will receive 
again what resignation took away. In the generalized theory of The 
Postscript, the overcoming of despair, i.e., of the wish to control what 
cannot be controlled, is conditioned by obedience to the infinite ethi­
cal demand to “die away from immediacy”. But this movement of 
resignation has to be supplemented by a return to, or positive affir­
mation of, concrete existence.
In short, ethical consciousness according to Kierkegaard pre­
supposes: (1) “reflective transcendence of the initial aesthetic imme­
diacy”; (2) “ ... an act of resignation through which the individual 
chooses himself in his concrete determinacy”, and (3) “positive affir­
mation of oneself.”9
From Logstrup’s point of view two modifications of this view are 
especially important: (1) Kierkegaard overlooks the definitive forms 
inherent in life. These confront man with an infinite ethical demand, 
not to abstract from immediacy, but to fulfill the deeds which the 
spontaneous life-utterances would have done if they were not cor­
rupted by man; (2) the task of taking over concrete existence is only 
necessary when the conditions of one’s existence are such that the 
individual is tempted to escape from them (like Kierkegaard himself). 
Kierkegaard is therefore not right in making absolute resignation a 
necessary pre-condition for religious faith. Living as an individual and 
as one in the crowd are therefore not mutually exclusive. There is a 
third possibility: to identify oneself with the spontaneous life-utter­
ance in taking responsibility for the situation.
In my view Kierkegaard does not see phenomena like love, chari­
ty and confidence, etc., as definitive forms. To gain definitive form 
they must be dependent on man’s decision. Definitive confidence, on 
this view, is a confidence man has decided himself for. Its definitive
form is dependent on the spontaneity and sovereignty of his deci­
sion.10
he question whether Kierkegaard is in line with the strict
anthropological dualism of Kant must however be negative­
ly answered. A very important point is that in Kierkegaard, ethical 
decision-making is in continuity with natural inclinations. Definitive 
love (love for one’s neighbour) is possible because it is possible for 
reason and imagination to educate erotic love into love for one’s 
neighbour. This line of thought is essential in Judge William’s treat­
ment of aesthetic love in Either-Or II. His advocacy of marriage pre­
supposes the possibility of conserving passion and the aesthetic 
validity of love in marriage. The decision gives substance and defini­
tive form to natural love.
It seems, therefore, that Kierkegaard argues in favour of a modi­
fied Kantian ethic. This modification includes (1) an alternative con­
cept of the a priori; and (2) a more adequate view of the relationship 
between duty and inclination. The ethical life presupposes and trans­
forms the aesthetic.
According to Kant man can be governed by reason although all 
his maxims originate from inclination. But the inclination is never 
ethical, even if it does the same as the duty compels us to do. Only 
the deed performed with respect for the categorical imperative is 
ethical.
Kierkegaard rejects the dualism between inclination and ethical 
duty. His theory underlines the perfectibility and potentiality for ethi­
cal decision inherent in natural inclinations. Starting in Either-Or with 
the question: “Are passions then the pagans of the soul? Reason 
alone baptized?” his analysis could be seen as different ways of 
taking care of the true nature of the passions in decision-making.1
I n this article I have only touched upon a small selection of the problems involved in the L0gstrup -  Kierkegaard debate. The just­
ification for the following conclusions is therefore not completely pre­
sented in the previous sections.
Danish philosophy has as one of its most obvious characteris­
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tics its personalistic and nearness-tolife approach. Kierkegaard is the 
great representative of this type of philosophy. But inherent in his 
analysis are some problematic presuppositions. Due to his polemical 
situation (Hegel), admiration of Socratic modesty and respect of 
Kantian scepticism, he adhered to epistemological and anthropolog­
ical presuppositions which do not adequately describe the human 
situation. When it comes to anthropology I have indicated that the 
picture is somewhat more complex, placing Kierkegaard somewhere 
between the strict anthropological dualism of Kant and L0 gstrup’s 
vindication of descriptive ethical, definitive pre-cultural phenomena. 
For Kierkegaard, inclination does not contain fully developed definiti­
ve forms, since it is dependent on decision and on the will being 
“baptized”.
Maintaining the task of describing human existence and under­
lining the importance of the human individual, L0gstrup gives atten­
tion to pre-cultural definitive forms and the possible religious inter­
pretation of these. It is very important to see that security and objec­
tive relaxation is not attained by this strategy. The existential charac­
teristics of decision-making, becoming and responsibility are still valid 
according to L0gstrup’s description of human existence. Religious 
faith is not based on total objective uncertainty or on the absurd, but 
on interpretation of fundamental phenomena which in the end have 
to be decided for or against.12
Logstrup had the opportunity to learn from and criticize Kierke­
gaard. Assuming the main task of philosophy to be description and 
interpretation of reality and the conditions it offers for human exis­
tence, there should be no hesitation in using Kierkegaard for the pur­
pose of criticizing the late L0gstrup’s metaphysical project whenever 
it tends to develop into a speculation which loses contact with 
human existence. However, it is my belief that L0gstrup really did 
learn from Kierkegaard and that he develops important Kierkegaar- 
dian motives with some rightly conceptualized modifications.
To sum up: In this article Logstrup is presented as a religious 
thinker belonging to the Grundtvigian tradition in Denmark. His main 
project, however, was to actualize the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of 
creation, using the phenomenology of Hans Lipps to describe and 
interpret fundamental phenomena religiously. In so doing he criti­
cized the transcendental idealism of post-Kantian continental phil­
osophy, focusing on its secular understanding of life. His attack on 
Kierkegaard must be evaluated against this background. He claimed
that Kierkegaard (1) adhered to the transcendental idealistic view of 
knowledge; and (2) overlooked or neglected the definitive form of 
interpersonal phenomena such as charity and confidence. Accepting 
L0gstrup’s epistemological criticism, the article argues in favour of a 
more nuanced interpretation of the anthropological dimension in 
Kierkegaard. He does not accept the Kantian dualism between incli­
nation and ethical duty, but argues in favour of a view that empha­
sizes that it is the intrinsic potentiality and perfectibility of human 
passions which make decision possible and successful.
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